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NOTES
UNIFORMITY OF UNIFORM LAWS
A recent amendment of section 11 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, See. 122.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes, by the Legislature,
for the apparent purpose of destroying its uniformity, has run counter
to the judicial principle of uniformity of uniform laws, and hence may
have failed to achieve non-uniformity.
The principle of uniformity is stated as follows in a very recent
opinion of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit,
which Circuit embraces Wisconsin:
"In the interpretation of .. . uniform laws, the decisions of
other jurisdictions on such points as have not been decided by
the courts of the forum, are not merely persuasive, but are as
binding as would be a decision of the highest court of the
forum."'
So important do the Courts consider this principle of uniformity,
that it has even been applied to restore to uniformity a section of uni-
form law which had been mutilated by a legislature.
An example of this occurred in Ariona. Under the authority of
Chap. 35 of the Session Laws of 1925, the statutes of that State were
codified, and the codifiers unfortunately made no distinction between
uniform laws and non-uniform laws in their attempts at "improving"
the language. Sec. 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provided
that a contract of conditional sale is void as against rights of certain
third parties which attach before the contract is filed, but that filing
within ten days after making the sale shall relate back as to intervening
rights. The revisers either wholly misinterpreted this ten-day proviso.
or thought that an idea of their own was better. At any rate, the)
changed it to read that the contract would be void as to all persons
except the buyer, unless filed within the ten days.
The first necessity for judicially interpreting this change arose in
a suit in Kansas, rather than in Arizona. A conditional sale contract
of an automobile sold in Arizona had been filed in the proper county
of Arizona, but not until fourteen days after the sale. The car was
then illegally sold by the conditional vendee outside Arizona, and
eventually found its way into Kansas, in the hands of a person from
whom an assignee of the original vendor sought to replevy it.
The Supreme Court of Kansas applied the principle of uniformity
to the Arizona law, in spite of its perfectly clear and categorical non-
" In re Halferty, 136 F. (2d) 640, 643 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
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uniform language, held that the filing had been timely, and awarded
the car to the plaintiff.2
The same question later came up in another suit, this time in
Arizona itself. The Supreme Court of Arizona cited the above Kansas
opinion, quoting the syllabus thereof as follows:
"Notwithstanding statute making conditional sale void as
to others than buyer if not recorded within ten days, belated
recording protects rights of holder as against one acquiring in-
terest after recordation."
The Arizona Court then purported to find an ambiguity in the
amended section, and hence an opportunity to construe the section in
the interests of uniformity, instead of cutting the Gordian knot as the
Kansas Court had done.3
The effect of the Castenada case is considerably weakened by the
fact that the Arizona revisers did such a poor job that the Supreme
Court of Arizona has repeatedly felt called upon to restore the original
meaning of the statutes, even as to non-uniform laws.4 However, I
believe that these cases can be distinguished in two respects: (1) the
Castenada opinion expressly mentioned and relied upon the doctrine
of uniformity; (2) in all the cases the Court asserted that a clearly
intended change would stand, and that they would revert to the
original meaning only in event of ambiguity, and yet in the Castenada
case the pressure of the doctrine of uniformity caused the Court to
call ambiguous an instance of clear change.
Accordingly let us consider the amended section. It read:
"Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property
in the seller after possession of the goods is delivered to the
buyer, is valid as to all persons, except as hereinafter provided;
it is void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who,
without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or acquires
by attachment or levy or lien upon them, before the contract or
a copy thereof be filed as hereinafter provided; and is void as to
all persons except the buyer unless such contract or copy thereof
is so filed within ten days after the making of the conditional
sale."
There is here no possible ambiguity or conflict. The quoted section
provides: conditional sales are valid, except that for ten days afte r
making, until filed, they are void as against purchasers without notice
and attaching creditors without notice; and, if not filed within such
ten days they are void as against everyone but the buyer.
2 Commercial v. Gaiser, 7 P. (2d) 527, 134 Kan. 557 (1932).
3 Castenada v. National, 29 P. (2d) 730, 43 Ariz. 119 (1934).
4 Nethken v. State, 104 P. (2d) 159, 56 Ariz. 15 (1940) and cases cited. State v.
Glenn, 131 P. (2d) 363, 366 (Arizona, 1942).
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The Kansas Court had expressly declined to follow this express
language, reverting instead to the pre-amendment wording, to the
effect that when filed, no matter how late, the contract is valid against
all adverse rights arising thereafter.
The Kansas Court did this on the sole strength of the principle of
uniformity. The Arizona Court, although relying on that principle,
bolstered up the case by a fiction of ambiguity and an assumed conse-
quent need for reconciliation and interpretation.
All the foregoing is preparatory to a discussion of the 1943
amendment to Wisconsin's Section 11 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act (Sec. 122.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes).
In the 1941 Statutes, this section read as follows (italics mine):
"Refiling. The filing of conditional sale contracts provided
for in sections 122.05 to 122.07 shall be valid for a period of
three years only. The filing of the contract provided for by
section 122.08 shall be valid for a period of fifteen years only.
The validity of the filing may in each case be extended for suc-
cessive additional periods of one year from the date of refiling
by filing with the register of deeds a copy of the original contract
within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each period,
with a statement attached signed by the seller, showing that the
contract is in force and the amount remaining to be paid thereon.
Such copy, with statement attached, shall be filed -and entered
in the same manner as a contract or copy filed and entered for
the first time, and the register of deeds shall be entitled to a
like fee as upon the original filing."
This is the standard wording of the Commissioners of Uniform
Laws.
Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1943 rewrote the last two sentences
of this section to read as follows (italics again mine) :
"The validity of the filing may in each case be extended for
successive additional periods of one year from the date of [sic]
by filing with the register of deeds within thirty days next pre-
ceding th expiration of each period, with [sic] a statement
signed by the seller, his agent or attorney showing that the con-
tract is in force and the amount remaining to be paid thereon.
Such statement shall be entered in the same manner as the con-
tract or copy originally filed and shall be attached thereto by the
register of deeds who shall be entitled to a like fee as upon the
original filing."
The intent of this amendment is obvious, namely to do away with
the necessity of filing a copy of the original contract with the renewal
statement. But so, too, was the intent of the Arizona amendment even
more obvious.
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The Wisconsin amendment, taken literally, does not carry out its
intent, for it provides that a contract may be renewed by filing with
a renewal statement. Thus we have here an ambiguity, whereas the
Arizona amendment was perfectly clear and categorical.
The Arizona Court held that, in event of an ambiguous alteration
of a uniform law, the original meaning must still be followed. So the
Arizona case applies to the Wisconsin situation.
The Kansas Court held that, in event of even a clear alteration of
a uniform law ,the original meaning must still be followed. So the
Kansas case is an a fortiori authority for following the original mean-
ing in an ambiguous situation, such as the present.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has in the past strongly adhered
to the principle of uniformity.5
If, guided by the Kansas and Arizona precedents cited, the Wis-
consin Court applies this principle of uniformity to the present situa-
tion, they will hold that the 1943 amendment made no change what-
ever in Sec. 122.11.
At any rate, it would be the part of discretion for conditional ven-
dors to assume that no change was effected, and hence to file a copy
of the original contract with each renewal statement.
Incidentally -this situation, like the Arizona situation, should be a
lesson to legislators to leave uniform laws alone. The language of a
uniform law, like the language of any other statute, can of course in
many instances be improved. But, in the interests of uniformity, is this
ever advisable?
ROGER SHERMAN HOAR.*
5 Mlodzik v. Ackerman, 191 Wis. 233, 212 N.W. 790 (1926) ; Fidelity v. Planen-
scheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 397 (1930); Forgan v. Smedal, 203 Wis. 564,
234 N.W. 896 (1931).
*Member of Wisconsin Bar; Author of several law books including "Hoar
on Conditional Sales."
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